

Homework is due by **11pm of Nov 19**. Send by email to both “regev” (under the cs.nyu.edu domain) and “des480” (under the nyu.edu domain) with subject line “CSCI-GA 3210 Homework 8” and name the attachment “YOUR NAME HERE HW8.tex/pdf”. There is no need to print it. Start early!

1. ¹ Consider the following stateless SKE for a PRF family $\{f_k\}_k$. The secret key is a uniform $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$. To encrypt $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ choose $r \in \{0, 1\}^n$ uniformly and output the pair $(r, f_r(k) \oplus m)$.
 - (a) (1 point) Describe a decryption procedure, and prove correctness.
 - (b) (6 points) Is the scheme multi-message secure? A hint for 2 points (ID 90016)
 - (c) (2 points) (extra credit) Is the scheme single-message secure?
 - (d) (0 points) (extra Brownie points) Is there *any* PRF for which the scheme is secure?
2. (CCA security)² Recall the PRF-based “XOR” stateless secret-key encryption scheme we had in class. The key is a uniform $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$. To encrypt $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$, choose a uniform $r \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and output $(r, f_k(r) \oplus m)$. To decrypt (r, c) , output $f_k(r) \oplus c$. We showed that this scheme is IND-CPA (chosen plaintext) secure. Here we consider two stronger security notions against *chosen ciphertext* attacks in which the adversary has access to the decryption oracle, $\text{Dec}_k(\cdot)$ in addition to $\text{Enc}_k(\cdot)$ and the challenge oracle. In the first one, called *lunch-time attack security* or IND-CCA1 security, the adversary can call the decryption oracle only before calling the challenge oracle. In the second, IND-CCA2 security, he can also call it after calling the challenge oracle, but then, of course, he is not allowed to call the decryption oracle with the ciphertext returned to it by the challenge oracle (why?).
 - (a) (4 points) Show that the XOR scheme is not IND-CCA2 secure.
 - (b) (8 points) Prove that the XOR scheme is IND-CCA1 secure.
 - (c) (4 points) (Extra Credit) Let $\{f_k : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}\}$ be a family of *strong PRPs* on $2n$ bits. Consider the scheme in which we encrypt a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ by choosing $r \in \{0, 1\}^n$ randomly, and outputting $f_k(m|r)$. To decrypt c , output the first half of $f_k^{-1}(c)$. Prove that this scheme is IND-CCA2 secure.
3. (0 points) (*Expanding domain of PRF*.♣) Assume we have a PRF family $\{f_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}_k$. Let $H = \{h_k : \{0, 1\}^N \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}$ be another family of functions for some large N , say $N = n^2$. What property does H need to satisfy so that the family $\{f_k(h_{k'}(\cdot)) : \{0, 1\}^N \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}$ is a PRF family (where k and k' are chosen independently from the corresponding set of keys)? E.g., can we take H to consist of just the function that outputs the first n bits of its input?

¹A question asked in the Fall 2013 class by Huxley Bennett

²From Dodis