Homework is due by **11pm of Dec 3**. Send by email to both "regev" (under the cs.nyu.edu domain) and "ry849" (under the nyu.edu domain) with subject line "CSCI-GA 3210 Homework 10" and name the attachment "YOUR NAME HERE HW10.tex/pdf". There is no need to print it. Start early!

- 1. $(Lossy Encryption)^1$ Let (Gen, E, D) be a public key encryption scheme. In this problem we define a new property for PKE schemes that we call "lossy encryption". We say that a scheme (Gen, E, D) is *lossy* if there exists an algorithm $LossyGen(1^n)$ which generates a "lossy" public key PK' (without a secret key) such that the following two properties are satisfied:
 - 1. A lossy public key is computationally indistinguishable from a public key generated by Gen: $PK \approx PK'$. More formally, for any PPT adversary A it holds:

$$|\Pr[A(PK) = 1|(PK, SK) \leftarrow Gen(1^n)] - \Pr[A(PK') = 1|PK' \leftarrow LossyGen(1^n)]| \le \operatorname{negl}(n)$$

- For any lossy public key PK' ← LossyGen(1ⁿ), encrypting any message using PK' produces ciphertexts that have identical distribution. Namely, for any PK' ← LossyGen(1ⁿ), and any pair of messages m₀, m₁ ∈ M, we have (PK', E(PK', m₀)) ≡ (PK', E(PK', m₁)). Intuitively, notice that this second property is saying that encrypting using the lossy public key completely loses information about the original plaintext, and thus it is not possible to decrypt.
- (a) (5 points) Prove that if an encryption scheme is lossy according to the definition provided above, then the scheme is also IND-CPA-secure.

A small hint (ID 51588)

Consider the following scheme as a potential candidate for being a lossy public key encryption. $Gen(1^n)$ chooses a random *n*-bit large "safe" prime *p* (i.e., p = 2q + 1 for a large prime *q*) and chooses two random generators g_0, g_1 of $G = QR_p$ (recall that QR_p is the subgroup of quadratic residues in \mathbb{Z}_p^*). Next, it chooses two random (but distinct) values $x_0, x_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, computes $h_0 = g_0^{x_0}$, $h_1 = g_1^{x_1}$, and outputs $PK = (p, g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1)$ and $SK = (x_0, x_1)$.

To encrypt a 1-bit message $m \in \{0, 1\}$, E(PK, m) proceeds as follows: choose a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and output $C = (g_m^r, h_m^r)$.

- (b) (3 points) Describe a decryption algorithm.
- (c) (8 points) Second, prove that the scheme described above (together with the decryption algorithm that you obtained from part (b)) is a lossy public key encryption based on the DDH assumption. Namely, first describe a lossy key generation algorithm LossyGen(1ⁿ) and then show that it satisfies both properties (1) and (2). Deduce that the scheme is IND-CPA-secure. A hint for 2 points (ID 51589)
- (d) (5 points) Although the lossy property may be nice and useful in some contexts, this is not necessary to prove that the scheme is IND-CPA-secure. Prove *directly* that this scheme is IND-CPA-secure under the DDH assumption; namely,

$$(g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1, g_0^{r_0}, h_0^{r_0}) \approx (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1, g_1^{r_1}, h_1^{r_1})$$

A small hint (ID 51599)

¹From Dodis